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WEBSTER ON THE TERRITORIES.
The new field of legislation, which our acquisition of Puerto
Rico and the Philippines has opened before us, makes the constitu-
tional relation of Congress to the Territories of unusual importance.
Respecting this question two views are held, differing from each
other theoretically and practically. One is that the Territories are
part of the United States, and under the Constitution; the other is
that they are neither the one nor the other. The former vriew may
be designated constitutionalism, the latter extra-constitutionalism.
Of the extra-constitutionalists the great protagonist is Webster,
though his authority is cited oftener than his argument. -An ex-
amination of his argument will perhaps explain this fact.
In the United States Senate, during the session of 1848-49, a
remarkable debate arose on a proposition to "extend" the Constitu-
tion over the territory recently acquired from Mexico, comprising
the Territorial divisions of California, New Mexico, and Utah. The
supporters of this proposition, holding that the Constitution sanc-
tioned the introduction of slavery into such territory, assumed that
Congress, by simply declaring the Constitution to be "extended"
over the territory, would put the Constitution, so far as applicable,
in full operation there, without the necessity of specific legislation
for the purpose, thereby enabling slavery, as they hoped, success-
fully to run the gauntlet of a hostile majority in Congress, and effect
a standing, if not a lodgment, in the new Territories.
The proposition called up Mr. Webster, from whose speech on
the occasion I quote as it is given in Benton's "Examination of the
Dred Scott Decision," a pamphlet zealously upholding Webster's
position. He began by saying:
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"It is of importance that we should seek to have clear ideas and
correct notions of the question which this amendment of the mem-
ber from Wisconsin has presented to us; and especially that we
should seek to get some conception of what is meant by the proposi-
tion, in a law, to 'extend the Constitution of the United States to
the Territories.' Why, sir, the thing is utterly impossible. All the
legislation in the world, in this general form, could not accomplish
it. There is no cause for the operation of the legislative power in
such a manner as that."
Assuredly, there is not; and there is, what Mr. Webster appar-
ently overlooked, as little cause for the operation of the legislative
power for such a purpose as that. It is the office of legislation
to execute the Constitution, not to extend it. The word extend, as
we have just seen, was used insidiously in the Senate proposition,
to import not the mere fact that the Constitution extended over the.
new Territories, but the execution of the Constitution withih those
Territories, so as to dispense with the further action of Congress in
opening them to the admission of slave property; and Mr. Web-
ster's qualifying phrases show that he inadvertently countenanced
this artful confusion of language, for there is no "form" or "manner"
in which legislation can extend the Constitution, unless extend be
used in the sense of execute. In the circumstances, his submission
in any degree to this "weak invention of the enemy" seems unac-
countable.
The Constitution does not need to be extended. Though not
self-executing, it is self-extending; it goes with the land of which
it declares itself to be the supreme law, as the form goes with the
substance. It is co-extensive with the political jurisdiction of the
government that it creates, requiring, indeed, the intermediation of
Congress to carry its powers into effect, but requiring or permitting
no extraneous agency to extend it. As the organic law, the Consti-
tution cannot be extended, in any proper sense of that term, save
by amendment in accordance with its own provisions; and amend-
ment is an act involving the special sanction of the sovereign, for the
power to amend the Constitution is itself a delegated power-a
power delegated to the people of three-fourths of the States respec-
tively, by the people of all the States respectively, in whom alone
resides the sovereignty in our political system. Three-fourths
of the States may lawfully amend the Constitution, but only
the whole number of the States could lawfully abolish it. All
the States made the Constitution, and less than all the States
cannot unmake or remake it, except by force. The Constitution
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itself, in providing that it should be established when nine States
ratified it, provided also that it should be established only between
the States ratifying it, thus requiring virtually that the ratification
should be unanimous. If Rhode Island, the last of the thirteen
States that ratified the Constitution, had not ratified it, the Consti-
tution would have been established nevertheless, but Rhode Island
would not be to-day a member of our body politic.
Congress, therefore, cannot extend the Constitution in any mode.
It of course can extend its own laws; and it was the linking of the
Constitution with these in the proposition offered in the Senate-
implying that the Constitution was extended over the Territories in
the same sense as the enumerated laws, and would be equally opera-
tive, independently of special legislation-which constituted the
undoubted subtlety of the scheme; wherein contemporaries pro-
fessed to have no difficulty in tracing the "fine Italian hand" of Mr.
Calhqun, who was in the Senate, and defended the proposition in
debate.
The proposition was certainly fallacious, as well as insidious;
but Mr. Webster, while rejecting rather than exposing the fallacy,
committed another, not less transparent, and much more serious.
The reason why Congress cannot "extend" the Constitution to the
Territories he went on to explain as follows:
"What is the Constitution of the United States? Is not its very
first principle, that all within its influence and comprehension shall
be represented in the legislature which it establishes, with not only
a right of debate and a right to vote in both Houses of Congress,
but a right to partake in the choice of the President and Vice-Presi-
dent? And can we by by-law extend these rights or any of them to
a Territory of the United States? Everybody will see that it is alto-
gether impracticable."
This "principle," thus phrased or paraphrased, obviously implies
nothing less than that the Territories are independent of the Consti-
tution. Mr. Webster called it the "very first principle" of the Con-
stitution, though the principle is not expressed in the Constitution,
nor does the Constitution, in some of its important provisions, con-
form to the principle, as he travestied it. The Constitution does
not grant the District of Columbia these rights or any one of them,
but, on the contrary, denies them all to it, not temporarily but
permanently. Is the District of Columbia not within the "influence
and comprehension" of the Constitution? And do the sites of the
forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings
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of the United States, stand with the District of Columbia, and with
the Territories, outside of the Constitution that expressly provides
for the government of them all?
The right to be represented in Congress and the Electoral Col-
lege is not a test of the nationality of a region, any more than the
right to vote or hold office is a test of citizenship. The test of
nationality in this relation, instead of being representation in the
government, is subjection to its jurisdiction; and it will not be dis-
puted that the Territories, as well as the District of Columbia, and
the other places named, are under the jurisdiction of the govern-
ment, or that the government, with its jurisdiction, is the creature
of the Constitution. How, then, could it be seriously said that the
Territories are not within the "influence and comprehension" of the
Constitution?
Much acuteness has been wasted in this inquiry, it appears to
me, in exploring the meaning of the term "United States." That
term is the name of a body politic created by the Constitution, of
which body politic the States united under the Constitution are the
members, and the jurisdiction whereof is co-extensive with the ter-
ritory, as conversely the territory is co-extensive with the jurisdic-
tion, itself created and defined, I repeat, by the Constitution. All
the territory subject to the United States, therefore, is subject to the
Constitution of the United States: the States, the District of Colum-
bia, the other places ceded by States to the United States, the Terri-
tories, organized and unorganized, are but divisions of the general
territory under the jurisdiction of the United States, and, conse-
quently, under the Constitution. The extent of the territory over
which the United States exercises jurisdiction is a question of fact,
to be determined as such; the question of the limitations of the
jurisdiction is a question Of law, to be determined by the Constitu-
tion that grants the jurisdiction.
The name of a body politic, whatever the name may be, can
have nothing to do with the extent of the territory subject to the
body politic, which depends on the vicissitudes of its affairs. As a
body politic the United States supposes no territory, except as the
necessary theatre of its operations-that is, in the vague sense in
which territory necessarily enters into the conception of a nation.
The extent of the territory of the United States is not a constitu-
tional question, and cannot be answered by anything contained in
the Constitution. One might as well look into the Constitution to
find the name of the individual who is President at this time, or the
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amount of the receipts and expenditures of the government for the
last fiscal year. The simple existence of the government in opera-
tion implies territory of some extent, as it implies a President of
some name, and receipts and expenditures of some amount: but
not otherwise. Save in this sense, the term "United States" is not
used at all in the Constitution to express extent of territory. As to
the actual extent of the territory of the United States, it expresses
or implies nothing. It is as silent respecting the extent of the ter-
ritory as it is respecting the extent of the population. And this is
equally true of the several States composing the body politic of the
United States, all of which are themselves bodies politic.
It follows that with respect to the subject under discussion the
term "United States" has no significance. It is simply the cor-
porate name of the general government, throwing as much light,
and as little, on the powers of Congress over the Territories, as the
style "The People of the State of New York,"* for example, throws
on the powers of the New York Legislature over the Adirondacks,
or the Erie Canal, or any other subject of legislation in the Empire
State. And this, whether the term "United States" is used to denote
the body politic or the members of the body politic collectively, the
difference between the two uses being that the former use conveys
unity of idea, the latter plurality, as the term "Congress," though
as unitary as that of "legislature," is used plurally in the Constitu-
tion, and till recently was used by good writers in the singular and
the plural indifferently (it was used in the plural by Mr. Webster
in one of the passages quoted below), though its plural use has
nearly passed out of vogue, as the plural use of "United States" is
gradually passing, under stress of the ever-increasing sense of unity
in the national life. This I deem a wholesome sign, marking the
progressive confirmation of our nationality, without indicating a
tendency to political consolidation, which, undoubtedly, would be
a symptom of national decay. But the bearing of the term in ques-
tion on any point of constitutional construction is nil.
Whatever territory, then, is subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States is within the United States, and under the Constitu-
*Suppose the constitutional name of our Country, instead of being
United States of America," were "Republic of America," the Constitution
in other respects remaining as it is. Would anybody in that case vex the
name to tell him whether or not the Territories were a part of the Republic of
America, and subject to its Constitution? The question answers itself, and at
the same time exposes the fallacy of this argumentum ad nombsem.
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tion. How great or little it may be at a given period (it is now
upwards of a hundred thousand square miles greater thafn it was
a year ago) is a question of fact, as said before, to be settled by
evidence, in lieu of a priori reasoning; but if we would know, what
is infinitely more important, the powers of the United States over
the territory subject to its jurisdiction, we must turn not to the
name but to the Constitution of our country. A corporation, it is
to be remembered, does not consist in the possessions of its mem-
bers or in its own possessions, but in its franchises, which are set
forth in its charter, not infolded in its name. Examining the name
of a corporation, to ascertain the powers of the corporation, is
attempting to make the tail wag the dog, if the expression may be
allowed. The method, aside from its futility, involves a tremendous
loss of mental leverage.
It will be said that the final clause of the thirteenth amendment
implies that places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
are not of necessity within the United States. The clause does
appear to imply this distinction, but the appearance is due to the
fact that the term "United States," though used only a single time
in the amendment, is used in two ways at once-to signify the
members of the body politic, and at the same time the body politic
itself-which is more than human language can bear without tor-
sion. However, as the members of the body politic constitute the
body politic, and "United States" as the name of the latter is put
by metonymy for the former in the Constitution and in constitu-
tional literature, the two modes of use, while confusing when mixed
together in the same term at the same time, are equivalent to each
other, and the final clause, referring to the one mode, and the penul-
timate clause, referring to the other, have the same denotation; so
that the final clause, as the outcome of it all, is simply tautological-
mere surplusage. It is possibly a literary more than a constitu-
tional blunder. It is certainly a blunder of some sort.
As I may seem to impeach the competency of the authors of the
thirteenth amendment, however, it is excusable in this connection to
recall the historical fact that the same body which formulated the
thirteenth amendment made the admission of the Southern States
-to their place in the Union conditional on their ratification of that
-amendment; not only requiring each of those States to exercise
under dictation the sovereign power of a State as the price of its
recognition as a State, but asserting the legal dissolution of the
Union in the hour of its military triumph, and reconstructing it in
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open disregard of the *equality of the States under the Constitution.
One may be pardoned for declining to accept as a constitutional
authority the body that perpetrated in the face of all the world this
colossal and stupendous contradiction. So far as constitutional
precedent is concerned, indeed, the reconstruction period might be
treated by history, in my opinion, as Tom Marshall said the Tyler
Administration should be treated, put in a parenthesis, "which,"
added Marshall, "Lindley Murray says should be read in a low tone
-of voice, and may be left out altogether without injury to the sense."
This in passing.
The principle which Mr. Webster caricatured in the passage
cited above, begging the reader's pardon for digressing, is the famil-
iar principle of no taxation without representation. As a cardinal
maxim of free government, it is, in its just import, substantially em-
bodied in the Constitution, nor is the spirit of it violated by any of
the provisions of that instrument, not excepting the provisions
relating to the District of Columbia and the Territories. Against
any real violation of this principle, the District and the Territories
alike are guaranteed, through the common interest in their welfare
cherished by the representatives of the whole nation, under whose
immediate protection the Constitution places them. The Territo-
ries have an additional guarantee, moral and political, in being the
wards of the nation, and heirs of Statehood--corporate minors; so
that their conditional exclusion from participation in the govern-
* Apropos of the equality of the States, it has been asked what could be
done. if Utah, disregarding the condition she accepted on her admission into
the Union, should establish polygamy. The question is academic at present,
and probably will remain so; but, should it become practical, the procedure in
the case, it seems to me, would not be doubtful. The Supreme Court would
be called on to decide, in the first place, whether or not the condition in ques-
tion put Utah on a footing of inequality with the other States, none of whiih
are subject to this condition, or to a condition of like import. If the court de-
cided in the affirmative, declaring the condition void, Utah would have to be
recognized in this matter as standing on her rights as a State, and the only
remedy would be to prohibit polygamy, as slavery is prohibited, by constitu-
tional amendment. If the court decided in the negative, declaring the condi-
tion valid, the decision in effect would extend the condition to the rest of the
States, virtually making the prohibition of polygamy a part of the Constitution
as it is; in which event the procedure would be the same as if the constitu-
tional prohibition were express and formal, in place of constructive. The sub-
ject of punishment would not be the State (the general government does not
act on a State), but the individual citizen of the State who, misled by the law
of the State, should violate the law of the land. On this sound principle of
procedure the rebellion was put down. "
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ment is no more a violation of the principle in hand, when stripped
of hyperbole, than is the conditional exclusion of natural minors
from participation in the suffrage. The rights of Statehood, in the
one case, like the rights of manhood, in the other, are simply in
abeyance.
In both cases, Mr. Webster's "very first principle" of the Consti-
tution, accepting the extravagant form in which he stated it, is
given its proper effect, and the rights that he declared it impracti-
cable to extend -to a Territory are in a broad sense actually extended
under the Constitution to every Territory (and have been since the
organization of the government), as soon as the Territory becomes
qualified for admission as a State into the Union-comes of con-
stitutional age; they are withheld only during its constitutional
minority.
Thus the Territories, judged by a fair application even of Mr.
Webster's exaggerated criterion, to say nothing of the express and
the implied provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to
govern them, and nothing of the constitutional prohibitions on
Congress in the act of governing them, are subject to the Constitu-
tion at all points; as must needs be, we have seen, if they are subject
to the United States, which has no jot of power not delegated by
the Constitution. "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States," the Consti-
tution says, "are reserved to the States respectively or to the
people." This goes indeed without saying. It is a corollary from
the Constitution. As the powers of the government are all dele-
gated powers, a power not delegated is necessarily reserved. Even
a power prohibited to the States, if not delegated to the United
States, is reserved to the people of all the States, respectively-the
sovereign; subject to whose will the individual States hold all their
powers. A sovereign not absolutely sovereign is not a sovereign.
In the debate on the Resolution to annex Hawaii, -a dis-
tinguished Senator* (who made a very instructive speech on the
wrong side) boldly reversed, in the face of the Constitution, this
principle of reserved powers, for the purpose of showing that the
right to acquire territory is not a constitutional right, express or
implied, but an undelegated right of sovereignty--"an inherent,
sovereign right," he styled it. "The right to acquire territory,"
said this Senator, "was not reserved, and therefore it is an inherent,
sovereign right. Look the Constitution through, study its clauses,
* Senator Platt, of Connecticut.
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and you will find in it no suggestion that there was any reservation
of the right to acquire territory to the States or to the people."
The Senator would seem to have spoken under the impression that
the Constitution enumerates the reserved powers, and lumps the
delegated powers. He could not have been fresh from his "'study"
of the tenth amendment. If the right to acquire territory was not
reserved, as he says, and says truly, it must be delegated, for all the
rights of the nation are either reserved or delegated; there are no
middle rights. Every right of sovereignty, whether reserved or
delegated, is inherent, but inherent in the sovereign, at whose will
it may be revoked if delegated, or delegated if reserved. The rights
of the sovereign as such are inalienable and indefeasible.
Accordingly, there is in our government, which consists exclu-
sively of delegated powers, no such thing as an inherent power that
is neither reserved nor delegated. A power not delegated is re-
served; a power not reserved is delegated; and, while both powers
are inherent in the nation, neither is inherent -in the government,
which is the nation's deputy, expressly authorized and expressly
bound by the Constitution. In the complex community known as
the United States, the sovereignty, as said above, is lodged in the
people of all the States respectively, acting separately, and unani-
mously, as when they established the Constitution. It is to this
collective sovereign that every department of the government, the
government as a whole, and even the commanding group of States
empowered to amend the Constitution, bow submissively; but
which itself bows to no power on earth. It is only to this sovereign
that undelegated powers belong, and not to the goyernment which
this sovereign has specially delegated to do its bidding. There is
but one way in which the government of the United States can
lawfully get possession of an undelegated power-by a supplemen-
tary delegation in an amendment to the Constitution; there is no
store of powers, undelegated and unlimited, whereon the govern-
ment may draw ad libitum or draw at all-no short cut to the re-
served powers, except by usurpation. If this doctrine is not true,
we might as well tear up our Constitution, and give the fragments
to the wind; for in that case the government which the Constitu-
tion creates may at pleasure do it for us, and ultimately will, usurp-
ing one after another, under the guise of its own inherent power,
the reserved powers of the sovereign, till it becomes itself the
sovereign, and the people become its slaves.
It should be added that the Senator under notice dwelt at some
length on the right of acquiring territory by discovery and occupa-
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tion, as a right neither reserved nor delegated, yet possessed by the
government as "an inherent, sovereign right." Concerning this
view it will suffice to point out that the right of discovery and occu-
pation exists by the law of nations, which is incorporated in the
Constitution (written or unwritten) of every government, and is
expressly made a part of our own Constitution by the eighth section
of the first article. Hence, the right, so far as concerns our govern-
ment, is a delegated right-as much so as the right to borrow
money or to coin it. The notion of inherent rights in the govern-
ment of the United States is a logical and political illusion. It is
more. It is an invitation and a cloak to usurpation.
Let us return to Mr. Webster. Continuing his speech, he thus
unfolded the implication of his "very first principle":
"The Constitution is extended over the United States, and over
nothing else. It cannot be extended over anything, except over the
old States, and the new States that shall come in hereafter, when
they do come in. * * * It seems to be taken for granted that the
right of trial by jury, the habeas corpus, and every principle de-
signed to protect personal liberty, is extended by force of the Con-
stitution itself over every new territory. * * * It is said that
this must be so, else the right of habeas corpus would be lost. Un-
doubtedly these rights must be conferred by law, before they can
be enjoyed in a Territory."
The fact that "these rights must be conferred by law, before they
can be enjoyed in a Territory," Mr. Webster adduced as evidence
that the Constitution does not extend over a Territory, though his
language in the third sentence distinctly implies, in flat opposition
to his express assertion in the preceding sentence, that the Consti-
tution does extend over a Territory, denying only, what nobody
affirms, that the Constitution by its own force carries its provisions
into effect in a Territory. In trying to uphold his conclusion he
appears to have upset his premises. The fact is that "these rights"
must be both enforced and conferred by law, before they can be
enjoyed in a Territory, or State either, or anywhere else. In a
State, they are conferred by the State Constitution, and enforced by
the State legislature; except within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal government, where they are conferred by the federal Consti-
tution, and enforced by the federal legislature. In a Territory,
they are conferred as well as enforced by the federal legislature, as
the supreme authority of the Territory, exercising on its behalf the
powers of a State; except also within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal government, where, as under the like jurisdiction in a
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State, they are conferred directly by the 'federal Constitution, and
enforced by the federal legislature as such, not as the legislature of
the Territory. A frame of government cannot act by its own force
anywhere. It needs everywhere the exercise of legislative power
to put it into effect.
It is this necessity simply, and not the extra-constitutionality of
the Territories, that Mr. Webster's citation proves. The evidence
cited is true, but not relevant. The point which he undertook to
make is not that legislation is necessary to execute a provision of
the Constitution extending to a Territory or elsewherewhich is con-
stitutional commonplace, but that the Constitution itself does not
extend to a Territory. The Constitution unexecuted in a Territory,
though extending over it (existent in it), is one thing; the Consti-
tion not only unexecuted in a Territory, but unextended over it
(inexistent in it), is quite another thing. The latter thing is what
Mr. Webster announced as his thesis; the former thing, that every-
body admits, is what he proceeded to maintain. He stepped at
once into the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion-a strange step, at any
stage, for the Expounder of the Constitution, in the act of expound-
ing it. Evidently (though that is not less strange) he was still, in
a fitful way, confounding the extension of the Constitution with
the execution of it. A subsequent turn of his mental kaleidoscope,
however, while replying to Mr. Calhoun, brought him face to face
with the question that he had engaged to argue; and he at last
argued it. Subjoined is his argument-the argument on which, to
do him justice, the partisans of extra-constitutionalism have since
relied, and rely now:
"The honorable Senator from South Carolina, conversant with
the subject as he must be, from his long experience in different
branches of the government, must know that the Congress of the
United States have established principles in regard to the Terri-
tories that are utterly repugnant to the Constitution. The Consti-
tution of the United States has provided for them an independent
judiciary; for the judge of every court of the United States holds
his office upon the tenure of good behavior. Will the gentleman
say that, in any court established in the Territories, the judge holds
his office in that way? He holds it for a term of years, and is re-
movable at Executive discretion. How did we govern Louisiana
before it was a State? Did the writ of habeas corpus exist in Louisi-
ana during its Territorial existence? Or the right to trial by
jury? Who ever heard of trial by jury there before the law creat-
ing the Territorial government gave the right to trial by jury? No
,one."
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The reader will notice-passing by these verbally mixed and
wholly irrelevant interrogatories, already answered by anticipation
-that Mr. Webster, in opening his argument, affirmed of the Terri-
tories: "The Constitution of the United States has provided for
them an independent judiciary." This affirmation is just 1 but, if
the Constitution has provided for them an independent judiciary,
how can that provision make or leave them independent of the
Constitution? Does it not, contrariwise, assert unequivocally their
subjection to the Constitution? And how can "principles," for
whose establishment the Constitution has provided, be "utterly re-
pugnant to the Constitution?" Having after much zigzagging
touched at length his main argumentk the first use he made of the
contact was t8 surrender his case. But, for sake of the argument,
we will return him his case.
The facts of the case are in substance as Mr. Webster stated
them; so far as he stated them. The judiciary article of the Con-
stitution, as modified by the amendments, requires among other
things that the judges of the federal courts shall hold their offices
during good behavior, and that in those courts the trial of specified
suits at common law, and of all crimes, except in cases of impeach-
ment, shall be by jury. These are facts, on the one hand; on the
other hand, Congress, irrespective of the judiciary article of the
Constitution, has established, with the sanction of the Supreme
Court, and the general assent of the people, Territorial courts the
judges of which hold their offices during a term of years, and in
which trial by jury, in both civil and criminal cases, is in the dis-
cretion of Congress granted or withheld, partially or wholly. Such
are the facts to which Mr. Webster referred. They prove, he
argued, that the Constitution does not extend over the Territories;
which, by consequence, are independent of the Constitution, and
not a part of the United States.
The argument is on the face of it a fallacy; since it assumes, not
only without evidence but in spite of proof, that if the judiciary
article of the Constitution does not extend to the Territories no
other provision of the Constitution does; whereas in the teeth of
this assumption, inadmissible in itself, is the acknowledged power
of Congress to govern the Territories implied in the power to ac-
quire new territory, and the express power of Congress "to make
all needful rules and regulations" respecting the territory belong-
ing to the United States. This is not all. The fallacy takes other
subject-matter, and goes deeper.
The argument assumes, in addition to the false assumption just
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mentioned, that if the judiciary article of the Constitution does not
extend to all classes of cases in the Territories, it does not extend
to the Territories at all. But the judiciary article of the Cotistitu-
tion, according to its own terms, extends only to the classes of
cases that it enumerates. It does not extend to all classes of cases
either in the States or in the Territories. It in fact extends to pre-
cisely the same classes of cases in the Territories as in the States-
that is, to all cases of federal cognizance in both, and to no case of
purely local cognizance in either. The jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary, like that of the federal government at large, is federal
only. It does not deal with controversies entirely local. The ar-
gument presupposes that the government of the United States, so
far at least as relates to its judicial power, is a consolidated republic,
instead of a federal republic. It mistakes the genius of our institu-
tions.
Excepting cases between citizens of the same State claiming
lands under grants of different States, the Constitution, indeed, in
no provision and no instance, directly contemplates the cognizance
of disputes between citizens of the same local community, be it a
Territory or a State. With respect to such disputes, which involve
nearly every object of human concern, the local government,
whether Territorial or State, is under the Constitution free to estab-
lish its own judiciary, subject only to its own supreme law (the will,
of Congress in the case of a Territorial government), without regard
to the special conditions imposed on the federal judiciary. The
people of the several States at the formation of the government,
having already incorporated into their State Constitutions the time-
honored guarantees of personal liberty, naturally demanded the in-
corporation of these into the federal Constitution, not as restrictions
on themselves, but as security against the encroachments of a gov-
ernment at once supreme in authority and beyond their immediate
control. Their demand was granted, partly before the adoption of
the Constitution, partly after; with the simple effect of adding to
the restraints on the federal government, without subtracting a tit-
tie from the powers of the States.
The bill of rights, that guards the personal liberty of the people
of a State from the encroachments of their own legislature, is to be
looked for in their own Constitution, not in the federal Constitu-
tion, which guards them from the encroachments of the federal
legislature only. The provisions constituting a virtual bill of rights
in the federal Constitution have no application to a State (whether
infant or adult), though every State has in its own Constitution (and
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Congress enacts for every Territory) similar provisions of equal or
greater efficacy, adopted without reference to the federal Constitu-
tion, many of them before that Constitution itself was adopted. It
belongs to a State in our system to order its own domestic affairs in
general. The Constitution leaves the people of the several States
supreme especially in the field of personal liberty. Therein the peo-
ple, having the power immediately in their own hands, are trusted
to protect their own rights, in their own way. In that sanctum
sanctorum of the political temple, where either liberty must live or
bear no life, they do not need, and would not brook, exterior con-
trol. The federal piovisions under consideration are intended
neither to impeach the spirit nor to invade the authority of the peo-
ple in this respect. Were it otherwise, the Constitution would not
have been ratified, or formed. That the States exacted this injury
and insult to themselves is inconceivable. What, if we consider it,
could be less admissible than the notion that proud Common-
wealths, such as Massachusetts, South Carolina, Virginia, New
York, hesitated to ratify the Constitution-for a time refused to
ratify it-because it contained no provision prohibiting them from
infringing the right of their own people to keep and bear arms; no,
provision prohibiting them from violating the right of their own
people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures; no
provision prohibiting them from depriving their own people of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; and so on? The
truth (historical and logical) is that the ten amendments adopted
on the proposal of the first Congress have no bearing on the States
in their relations to their own people. Those amendments bear
solely on the federal government in its relations to the people. They
prohibit the federal government from infringing the right of the
people of a State to keep and bear arms, and the rest, but place no
prohibition on the State itself, which they leave as they found it, free
to regulate the personal rights of its own people as it thinks fit,
within the limits of a republican form of government. They are
checks on federal power, not abridgments of State power-barriers
which the States have erected against the federal government, in-
stead of shackles which they have riveted on themselves.
The view of these amendments here expressed is established, in
my judgment, by the origin of the amendments; the avowed pur-
pose for which they were proposed; the avowed motive with which
they were ratified; the spirit of the whole Constitution' which they
amended; and even the first word of the first amendment, which,
as the amendments were proposed with reference to each other, as
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well as to the general defect they were designed to remedy, may be
reasonably construed as supplying the subject, and fixing the bear-
ing, of the prohibitions of all the rest, as it expressly does of the
prohibitions of the first. Besides, the whole series of amendments
proposed at the first session of the first Congress consisted Lf twelve,
two of which were rejected, but the operation of both of which, like
that of the first, fifth,* sixth, and seventh amendments of the ten
ratified, was restricted, expressly or impliedly, to the federal gov-
ernment; so that, out of the twelve amendments proposed by the
-first Congress at its first session, six referred by their own terms
to the federal government only, throwing on those, who claim that
the ten amendments adopted refer to the States in common with
the federal government, the burden either of proving that the terms
of one-half of the whole series did not mean what they expressed
or implied, or of overcoming the presumption (not to mention more
formidable presumptions) that the prohibitions of the other half,
without inteinal signs, were intended to have the same sphere of
operation as that indicated by the internal signs of the former half.
I apprehend that neither is possible-neither nullifying the internal
signs, nor rebutting the presumption they raise.
This view is opposed by nothing, I believe, except the mere
applicability of the subject-matter of some of the amendments to the
States, no less than to the federal government, which will ha-dly
appear strange when it is remembered tnat the substance of all the
amendments, and more substance to the same effect, had made part
of the State Constitutions before the federal Constitution was
thought of; and which at any rate, as just shown, is ruled by the
presumption arising from the internal signs of the leading amend-
ments. Authority, it is true, may be cited in opposition to the view;
but authority, without reason:, is nothing.
The attitude of the Territories and of the States towards the judi-
ciarv article of the Constitution, resuming the direct thread of my
argument, is identical. So true is this that Congress, in the exer-
cise of its power as the federal legislature, has divided the whole
*The words in the fifth amendment, "except in cases arising in the land
or navalforces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
.Public danger," point unmistakably to the federal government as the exclusive
subject of prohibition; as do the words in the sixth amendment, "trial by an
impartial jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been
committed;" and as do also in the seventh amendment the words, "no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."
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country, States and Territories indistinguishably, into judicial
districts, grouped into judicial circuits, without other geographi-
cal distinction, and without any political distinction, converting
the Constitution, in the process of executing the judiciary arti-
cle, into a palimpsest, as it were, from which State and Terri-
torial lines are erased, to make room for judicial lines. The Terri-
tory of Alaska, for example, constitutes a judicial district, assigned
to the ninth judicial circuit, which, besides the district of Alaska,
consists of the districts of California, Oregon, and Nevada. And
so with the other Territories. The majority of the States, it may
be noted, are divided respectively into two or more judicial dis-
tricts; and the President in his late annual message recommends
that the Territory of Alaska, the most rudimentary of the Territo-
ries, shall be divided in like manner, in which event Pennsylvania
and Alaska, next to the oldest State and the newest Territory, drop-
ping equally their political divisions, will be equally resolved into
a group of units of the judicial system. Moreover, the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to the judgments of Ter-
ritorial courts, as well as to those of State courts, witness the Con-
gressional act of 1891, and the case of Coquitlam v. the United
States, lately decided by the Supreme Court, on an appeal under
that act from the District Court of Alaska (the court of last resort
in the Territory). For the administrative purposes of the federal
judiciary, in short, the States and the Territories are one.
The Territories, therefore, are neither more nor less exempt
from the judiciary article of the Constitution than the States are.
Mr. Webster's argument, as usual in reasoning of this kind, proves
too much. If it is valid, the States are not under the Constitution
that unites them, or in the Union that they form.
In point of fact, the States are less under the Constitution than
the Territories are; for the States, exercising their reserved powers,
make their own Constitutions, while Congress, exercising the pow-
ers granted to it by the Constitution, makes all the laws (organic
and otherwise) for the Territories, until it admits them-as States
into the Union. In our constitutional system a Territory is heir to
the rights of a State. As a child, on attaining its majority, is en-
titled to the rights of manhood or womanhood, so under the Con-
stitution a Territory, when qualified for self-government, is en-
titled to the rights of Statehood, which, during the Territorial con-
dition, Congress holds in trust for the Territory, and exercises on
its behalf, surrendering them intact on admitting it as a State. A
Territory is constitutionally an infant State.
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It is this organic relation between the Territory and the State,
in connection with the function of Congress as the supreme
authority of the Territory, fiducially speaking, which makes the
Territorial judiciary, like the State judiciary, independent not of the
Constitution, indeed, as Mr. Webster hastily inferred, but of the
judiciary article of the Constitution, whose scope is exclusively
federal. The argument, considering who made it, is an astounding
misrepresentation of the facts. It is the more astounding, as the
conclusion is a self-contradiction, that should at once have brought.
the search-light of reason on the process whereby it was reached.
The constitution of a limited government, that should exclude from
its provisions a part of the country under the political jurisdiction
of the government, investing the government, as respects that part,
with unlimited powers, would contradict itself, as well as the nature
of sovereignty, one of whose properties is indivisibility. It would
be not only a political monstrosity, but happily a political impossi-
bility.
The key to the whole Territorial question, as I conceive, was
supplied by the Opinion of the Supreme Court in the very case, as it
happened, in which Mr. Webster employed professionally the argu-
ment that he revamped twenty years later, to meet the exigencies
of the sudden debate in the Senate. In the American Insurance
Company v. Canter, the court, referring to the Territories, and
speaking by Chief justice Marshall, said: "In legislating for them,
Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a
State government." The reason for this combination is not far
to seek. It has already been suggested. The Constitution em-
powers Congress to govern the Territories, and eventually to admit
them as States into the Union. These two provisions are virtually
complementary of each other, the latter provision involving a defi-
nition of the powers conferred on Congress in the former.
As to this latter provision, it may be said, by the way, undue
stress has been laid on the potential mode in the clause "New
States may be admitted by the Congress." May is here used not
to grant a favor, but to impose a function in the exercise of which
the public have the sole interest, and, hence, in accordance with a
recognized rule of legal construction, has the value of must; it is
not used permissively, but obligationally. "New States may be
admitted" does not mean in legal contemplation, therefore, that
new States, qualified for admission, may be admitted or excluded,
in the arbitrary discretion of Congress; it has thd same legal effect,
on the contrary, as if it read, "New States, lawfully constituted
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within the limits of the United States, and qualified for self-govern-
ment, shall be admitted." Such appears to be the just theory of
the clause; to which Congress in practice has invariably conformed,
overdoing rather than underdoing its duty in the premises. The
clause unquestionably makes Congress the judge of the fact of
qualification, and to this extent grants it discretion; but not further.
When a Territory presents the evidences of its title to admission,
and Congress cannot reasonably or honestly deny their sufficiency,
it is constitutionally bound to admit the Territory; its power under
the Constitution is henceforward ministerial. It has no greater
right, constitutional or moral, to refuse to admit a qualified Terri-
tory into the Union, than a testamentary guardian has to refuse to
surrender his guardianship when his ward comes of age. Whilst
the one is a crime against the legal rights of the individual citizen,
the other is a crime against the political rights of a great community
of citizens.
The extraordinary powers, to resume, with which the Constitu-
tion invests Congress, as the political guardian of the Tenitory, in
addition to its ordinary powers as the federal legislature, are meas-
ured by the powers which it surrenders to a Territory on admitting
it as a State-are the powers of a State, that is to say. The Su-
preme Court describes them, not quite accurately, I think, as the
powers of a "State government ;" they are strictly, it seems to me,
the powers of the State itself-of the people behind the State gov-
ernment, who make that government, and constitute the State.
-This same combination of powers, it may be mentioned,, Congress
exercises in legislating for the District of Columbia, and for the
other places over which it is expressly granted the power of exclu-
sive legislation, acquiring State powers over those places as the
legal successor of the States that ceded them.
It is to be observed, respecting this combination, that Congress,
in legislating for the Territories, exercises the powers of the gen-
eral government not in legislating for a particular Territory, but
for the Territories as a class, or as the property of the govern-
ment, or as belonging in common with the States to the tract
of country under the jurisdiction of the government. When
Congress, in exercising its constitutional powers over the Terri-
tories, comes to the boundary of an individual Territory, it drops its
powers as the national legislature, and enters clothed with those of
a State only. As the national legislature, it legislates for the nation,
not for a State, a Territory, or a District. As the supreme law-
maker of a Territory, it makes laws for the Territory, not for the
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nation, or any other body of people. Though Congress, no doubt,
when exercising State powers in a Territory, may confer on the
Territorial courts the jurisdiction of admiralty cases, and other
cases of federal cognizance, it can do this only in cases in which the
States may confer the same jurisdiction on their own courts-that
is, in cases wherein the jurisdiction of the federal courts is concur-
rent, not exclusive. The remark of the Supreme Court in the Can-
ter case, that a State court exercising admiralty jurisdiction must
be established under the third article of the Constitution (the judici-
ary article), though a Territorial court exercising the like jurisdic-
tion need not be, seems inconsistent not merely with the lawful
scope of that article, but with what may be called by pre-eminence
the Canter dictum, which immediately follows this remark in the
decision. Curiously enough, the dictum, on a roundabout survey,
appears not wholly to sanction the view which occasioned it, and
which it was originally employed to justify. In the cases just men-
tioned, as previously intimated, an appeal lies from the judgments
of the State or Territorial courts, through the inferior courts of the
United States, to the Supreme Court; and, in regulating the exer-
cise of this appellate jurisdiction, Congress resumes its primary
character as the national legislature. . But as the supreme author-
ity of an individual Territory, Congress exercises the powers of a
State, and no other powers.
It is these powers, no greater, no less, of which the Constitution
makes Congress the depositary during the minority of a Territory,
and which under the Constitution Congress delivers up to the Ter-
ritory on admitting it as a State. In this development of the dual
character of Congress into a rounded principle, complete in itself,
and universal in its application within the spheres of exclusive legis-
lation, various conflicting expressions of the Supreme Court, it may
be affirmed, are reconciled with its dictum in the Canter case, and
with each other. The principle, thus developed, fixes the status of
the Territories in our political system, if I mistake not, with scien-
tific precision.
It follows from this principle that whatever a State may do or
may not do within the sphere of its jurisdiction Congress may do
or may not do in a Territory. 'As a State may establish its own
judiciary to suit itself, Congress may establish a Territorial ju-
diciary to suit its own conception of fitness; and in doing so it acts
under the Constitution, not outside of it. The Territorial judiciary
and the federal judiciary, to be sure, are independent of each other,
except that in cases of federal cognizance an appeal lies from the
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former (exactly as it lies from the State tribunals) to the latter; but,
though independent of each other, neither is independent of the
Constitution, which provides for both.
The fundamental error of Mr. Webster's argument, as it appears
to me, consists in his not recognizing the distinction, though placed
under his eyes by the Supreme Court a score of years before, be-
tween Congress in its primary character as the federal legislature,
and Congress in its secondary character as the supreme power of
the Territories-the depositary of the rights of nascent States.
Touch the argument with this distinction, ever so lightly, and the
fabric of sophistry flies to pieces, like a Prince Rupert's drop.
If the authority of Congress over the Territories is derived from
the Constitution, it may be asked, what limits does the Constitution
impose on the authority? To begin with, all that Congress does in
a Territory, if it would observe the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion, must be "needful," and must tend to qualify the Territory for
Statehood, the constitutional destiny of every Territory. It of
course must not infringe, directly or indirectly, any provision of
the Constitution, express or implied. Specifically, the authority of
Congress over the Territories, as combining the powers of the gen-
eral government and of a State, is in reason limited by the consti-
tutional prohibitions on both. That it is limited by the prohibi-
tions on the general government, when Congress exercises the pow-
ers of the general government, will be conceded; but that it must
on a fair construction be limited also by the prohibitions on the
States, when Congress in legislating for a Territory exercises the
powers of a State, appears not only from the fact that the powers
exercised in thus legislating are State powers, uncombined with the
powers of the general government, but from the fact that, if free in
this case from the prohibitions on the States, the authority of Con-
gress in a Territory would exceed the powers which Congress de-
livers to the Territory on its admission into the Union. The pow-
ers of the trustee in possession cannot be greater than the powers of
the legal and beneficial owner when he comes into possession. The
guardian can have no power to do for his ward what his ward can
have no power to do for himself on coming of age.
If Congress, in the exercise of its power of exclusive legislation
over a Territory, could on behalf of the Territory emit bills of
credit, pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts, enter into
an agreement with a foreign power, or do any of the other things
prohibited to the States but -not to the United States, the Territory,
acting by its constitutional agent, would exercise greater powers
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than it would have when admitted as a State-the inchoate State,
in power and dignity, would surpass the complete or definitive
State; which is contrary to reason. The abeyant rights oi a Terri-
tory, which Congress holds as its guardian, and yields to it on ad-
mitting it into the Union, can rightfully neither go beyond nor fall
short of the rights of the Territory when it becomes a State. If
they did either, how could Congress, as their constitutional deposi-
tary, account for the excess or the deficiency? It Would have to
confess itself either a usurper or a defaulter.
The pbwer of Congress over the Territories is thus not unlim-
ited. There are in our government no unlimited powers. A lim-
ited government having unlimited powers is a contradiction in
terms. Next to the power of amendment, the power least limited
in our government is the treaty-making power; but the treaty-
making power is far from being unlimited. It is limited by the
fundamental principles of the government; by the form of the gov-
ernment; by the distribution of the powers of the government;
and by express provisions of the Constitution. For example,
a treaty would be void that undertook to dissolve the Union;
to change the government into a monarchy; to vest the judicial
power of the United States in Congress or the legislative power in
the President; to amend the Constitution in any particular without
regard to the mode of amendment prescribed by the instrument
itself; to deprive a State, without its consent, of its equal suffrage
in the Senate; or to establish slavery within the United States. A
treaty is valid when made "under the authority of the United
States," not otherwise; and "the authority of the United States" is
derived from the Constitution, and cannot be invoked by violating
it. In this republic, in fine,, the aegis of the Constitution covers
everything. No Territory of the United States, near or remote,
can escape the Constitution; any more than a man can outrun his
shadow. Our government is purely a government of law. Fxtra-
constitutionality is unconstitutionality.
A seeming anomaly in practice may be thought to mar the
theoretical symmetry of our system. What if an infant State, it
may be said, prove permanently incapable of self-government? In
that case, assuming the Territory to be a permanent possession,
there would be no choice but to keep it permanently in the Terri-
torial condition. The principle is that a Territory qualified for
self-government is entitled to admission as a State. This princi-
ple holds good in all cases; though in cases conceivable, if
not confronting us, the attempt fully to realize it might stretch
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out to the crack of doom. But that is not the fault of the principle.
Anyway, we must fight the course. There seems no alternative, as
things now are. If we have been so unfortunate or unwise as to in-
troduce into our national household a political incorrigible or set
of political incorrigibles, we shall have to pay the penalty, by taking
up "the white man's burden," and bearing it as we may in subordi-
nation to the Constitution, ready to fight it out on that line, in de-
fault of a better, if it takes all time. Meanwhile, we are not bound,
morally or constitutionally, to shut our eyes to any fair chance of
throwing off the burden, without injury to ourselves or to its con-
tents. In the event of meeting with such a chance, or of bringing
it to pass, the treaty-making power, exercised in negotiating a
treaty of independence, or even of cession, might open the door of
honorable relief from a situation become intolerable to us, without
any countervailing benefit to the Old Man of the Sea lashed on our
shoulders by treaty, and pinned to them by bayonets. This is a
constitutional possibility. One other resource there is. Should
we find it impracticable to manage our Territorial incorrigibles,
commercially or politically, under the Constitution as it stands, and
be willing to adapt our free institutions to barbarians sooner than re-
linquish the endeavor to adapt barbarians to them, We are at liberty
to alter the Constitution in the mode it prescribes. But we are not
at liberty, let us bear in mind, to alter it by usurpation. As for un-
delegated rights of sovereignty (what are called "inherent rights"),it
is the chief object of this article to accentuate the fact that in a gov-"ernment of enumerated powers such rights can have no existence.
Whatever we do, or refrain from doing, now or hereafter, it be-
hooves us to remember that we owe our first duty to ourselves, in-
cluding those institutions in which are enshrined our own hopes,
and the hopes of mankind. The unfading counsel of Polonius is as
apt for nations as for individuals:
"This above all, To thine ownself be true;
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."
PAUL R. SHIPMAN.
